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Standing on Ceremony: Can Lead Plaintiffs
Claim Injury from Securities That They Did
Not Purchase?
Corey K Bradyt

INTRODUCTION

Between 2007 and 2008, the American economy experienced
its worst contraction since the Great Depression.1 News soon
spread that a financial instrument called a "mortgage-backed
security" was a prime cause of this disaster, compounding a host
of extant problems in the housing market, including low interest
rates, relaxed lending standards, and misplaced assumptions
that prices would continue to rise indefinitely. 2 Yet the damage
done by mortgage-backed securities spilled beyond housinginstitutional investors 3 bet big on these products, only to realize
too late that many of these securities were backed by loans issued haphazardly at best, fraudulently at worst. Shockwaves
from the meltdown spread throughout not just the nation, but
the global economy, casting corporate titans and individuals

t BA 2010, Florida State University; JD Candidate 2015, The University of Chicago
Law School.
1 See Bob Willis, U.S. Recession Worst since Great Depression, Revised Data Show
(Bloomberg Aug 1, 2009), online at http://www.bloomberg.comlapps/news?pid=
newsarchive&sid=aNivTjr852TI (visited Aug 12, 2014).
2
See Jeff Holt, A Summary of the Primary Causes of the Housing Bubble and the
Resulting Credit Crisis:A Non-technical Paper,8 J Bus Inquiry 120, 121-26 (2009) (noting
that mortgage-backed securities were linked to all of the primary causes of the housing
bubble and the resultant collapse of the housing market).
3 Institutional investors are business entities that accumulate large sums of money
for investment; they include pension funds, banks, insurance companies, mutual funds,
and foundations. See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 Mich L
Rev 520, 595-604 (1990). Such organizations play an important role in financial markets. See id at 567-70.
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alike into ruin. 4 Six years later, the world is still struggling to
shake off the fallout.5
In the wake of this crisis, class action litigation alleging securities fraud has become commonplace.6 Investors in devalued financial products like mortgage-backed securities generally claim that
they were misled by misstatements or omissions in offering documents, for which they have recourse under federal law. Because
of the way that financial institutions promulgate these documents, one type of offering document-called a "shelf registration statement"-may be shared across many different securities
offerings. These offerings also involve unique documents called
"supplemental prospectuses," which describe the characteristics
particular to each security. Thus, while an allegedly misleading
shelf registration statement lends itself to class action litigation
regarding all offerings that it covers, supplemental prospectuses
differentiate between those offerings, diminishing their apparent
similarity and hence their susceptibility to class adjudication.
This tension has spawned uncertainty over class action
standing, which essentially requires that the class representative, acting on behalf of the class members, demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation Many courts have
held that lead plaintiffs must have personally purchased from
each securities offering that they seek to prove is fraudulent.8
However, some courts have allowed named plaintiffs in such
class actions to bring closely related claims without having purchased the same securities as other class members. 9 These conflicting decisions have given rise to the following question: Does
a named plaintiff have standing to litigate claims concerning
See Holt, 8 J Bus Inquiry at 126-28 (cited in note 2).
See Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development, Society at a
Glance 2014: OECD Social Indicators *17-35 (Mar 18, 2014), online at
http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/OECD2014-SocietyAtAGlance2Ol4.pdf (visited Aug 12, 2014)
(discussing the continuing impact of the 2008 recession on social indicators in several
countries).
6
See Christopher J. Miller, Note, "Don'tBlame Me, Blame the FinancialCrisis"'A
Survey of Dismissal Rulings in 10b-5 Suits for Subprime Securities Losses, 80 Fordham
L Rev 273, 289-90 (2011) (reviewing thirty-four such cases).
7
See Joseph McLaughlin, McLaughlin on Class Actions § 4:28 at 852 (West 10th
ed 2013).
8
See, for example, Plumbers' Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v Nomura Asset
Acceptance Corp, 632 F3d 762, 771 (1st Cir 2011); Maine State Retirement System v
Countrywide FinancialCorp, 722 F Supp 2d 1157, 1164 (CD Cal 2010).
9 See, for example, NECA-IBEW Health & Welfare Fund v Goldman Sachs & Co,
693 F3d 145, 164 (2d Cir 2012); In re CitiGroup Inc Bond Litigation,723 F Supp 2d 568,
584 (SDNY 2010).
4
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mortgage-backed securities that he or she did not actually
purchase?
This Comment addresses that question,10 which remains unresolved despite the billions of dollars at stake.11 It proposes a
two-step test for determining which claims, if any, a named
plaintiff in a mortgage-backed securities class action has standing to press. Each step captures a discrete set of cases. First,
drawing from common ground between the conflicting opinions
of the First and Second Circuits, this test asks whether allegedly
misleading language appears in the common shelf registration,
the supplemental prospectuses, or both. Second, expanding on
the Second Circuit's methodology, the proposed test asks whether
any loan originators were common to both the named plaintiffs
securities purchases and those of the entire class. Together,
these steps screen for standing more comprehensively and incisively than either of the current approaches.
This Comment comprises three parts. Part I provides background on mortgage-backed securities, federal securities law,
and standing doctrine. Part II presents the split that has developed in the circuit courts. After exploring the terrain between
these apparently polarized opinions, Part III proposes a two-step
test for class action standing.
I. BACKGROUND: MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES, SECURITIES
LAW, AND STANDING
This Part proceeds in three sections. The first examines
mortgage-backed securities and their role in the financial crisis.
10 As discussed in this Comment, the question is limited to mortgage-backed and
other asset-backed securities. Similar issues have also arisen in cases involving other

types of securities. Compare In re Salomon Smith Barney Mutual Fund Fees Litigation,
441 F Supp 2d 579, 604-07 (SDNY 2006) (holding that lead plaintiffs have standing to
represent purchasers only from mutual funds that they actually purchased), with In re
FranklinMutual FundsFee Litigation, 388 F Supp 2d 451, 461-62 (D NJ 2005) (deciding
that plaintiffs could bring claims against funds from which they had not purchased as
long as the named plaintiffs "pleaded direct claims" against those defendants). However,
because of the idiosyncratic way that mortgage-backed and other asset-backed securities
are structured-which is integral to analyzing and solving the highlighted problem-this
Comment necessarily narrows its scope to these products. See Part I.A.1. Also, for simplicity's sake, the various breeds of relevant asset-backed securities are referred to herein
as "mortgage-backed securities."
11 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Goldman, Sachs & Co v NECA-IBEW
Health & Welfare Fund, No 12-528, *3 (US filed Oct 26, 2012) (available on Westlaw at
2012 WL 5361534) ("Goldman Petition") (claiming that "the [Second Circuit's] decision
will effectively increase by tens of billions of dollars the potential liability that financial
institutions face in this and similar class actions").
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The second discusses relevant securities law and the idiosyncrasies of offering documents. The third describes the current state
of standing doctrine.
A.

Insecurity: Mortgage-Backed Securities and the Financial
Meltdown

The following two sections provide an overview of mortgagebacked securities and their role in the financial crisis. Part I.A. 1
describes the process of securitization, emphasizing how the
structure of a mortgage-backed security allocates risk. Part I.A.2
outlines how these products catalyzed a global disaster and
describes its consequences.
1. Securitization.12
At the heart of a mortgage-backed security is simply a pool
of mortgages-the familiar method by which most people pay for
a home. Mortgages are grouped together and sold by financial
14
institutions to raise capital,13 create a market for investment,
and increase the amount of credit available to homebuyers. 15 The
process begins with lenders, or "originators," who offer mortgages
to individual borrowers based on their perceived creditworthiness. 16 This process yields prime or subprime mortgages, with
the latter carrying higher interest rates and going to those with
relatively poor credit histories. 17 Thus, because of their greater
risk of default, those potentially least able to bear the financial
burden are saddled with the highest interest rates.' 8 This leaves

12 Securitization, also known as structured finance, is "[the] process of converting
relatively illiquid secured loans into freely tradable securities." Richard E. Mendales,
Collateralized Explosive Devices: Why Securities Regulation Failed to Prevent the CDO
Meltdown, and How to Fix It, 2009 U Ill L Rev 1359, 1367.
13 See Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street. Understandingthe Financial
Crisis,13 NC Bank Inst 5, 36-37 (2009).
14 See Aaron Unterman, Exporting Risk: Global Implications of the Securitization
of U.S. Housing Debt, 4 Hastings Bus L J 77, 92 (2008).
15 See Moran, 13 NC Bank Inst at 37 (cited in note 13).
16 See Jennifer E. Bethel, Allen Ferrell, and Gang Hu, Legal and Economic Issues
in LitigationArising from the 2007-08 Credit Crisis, in Yasuyuki Fuchita, Richard J.
Herring, and Robert E. Litan, eds, Prudent Lending Restored: Securitization after the
Mortgage Meltdown 163, 167 (Brookings 2009).
17 See Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Preliminary Staff Report: The Mortgage
Crisis *5-6 (draft report, FCIC Apr 7, 2010), online at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edul
cdn_mediafcic-reports/2010-0407-PSR_-_TheMortgageCrisis.pdf (visited Aug 12, 2014).
18 See Alexander S. Bonander, Note, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Due.Diligence
Failures: Should Comparative Responsibility Be Imposed on a Government-Sponsored
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lenders and subprime borrowers with a slim margin for error in
assessing what the homebuyer can afford: if either party overestimates, intentionally or unintentionally, the buyer may be
stuck with a debt load that he or she is unable to service.
Traditionally, lenders handled the mortgages that they originated throughout the instrument's lifespan, bearing the full
risk of default.19 For the reasons mentioned above,20 originators
now typically sell their mortgages to financial institutions called
arrangers, which are the next piece in the mortgage-backed security puzzle.21 An arranger is typically an investment bank and is
almost always a different entity than the originator.22 Arrangers
pool mortgages from various originators for two primary reasons:
(1) to achieve a sufficiently large asset value to support a secondary market, thereby making the securitization process economically worthwhile; and (2) to reduce risk through diversification.23 After aggregating a pool of mortgages, the arranger
transfers it to a special-purpose entity, which is a trust or subsidiary corporation designed to securitize the myriad loans.24
Special-purpose entities segregate the mortgages from the
arranger's other assets for legal and tax purposes. 25 Finally, with
the help of an underwriter,26 a ratings agency,27 and possibly a

Entity's Claims Brought under Sections 11(a) and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933?,
98 Iowa L Rev 835, 840 (2013).
19 See Kathleen C. Engel and Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street
Finance of PredatoryLending, 75 Fordham L Rev 2039, 2049 (2007).
20 See text accompanying notes 13-15.
21 See Richard M. Hynes, Securitization, Agency Costs, and the Subprime Crisis, 4
Va L & Bus Rev 231, 239 (2009).
22 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure's Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis,
2008 Utah L Rev 1109, 1111.
23 See Joseph C. Shenker and Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution,
Current Issues and New Frontiers,69 Tex L Rev 1369, 1377 n 29 (1991).
24 Hynes, 4 Va L & Bus Rev at 239 (cited in note 21).
25 See Shenker and Colletta, 69 Tex L Rev at 1377-78 (cited in note 23). One objective of special-purpose entities is to achieve bankruptcy remoteness. See id.
26 A securities underwriter buys securities-here, from the special-purpose entityand resells them to investors or otherwise facilitates distribution. See Joseph K. Leahy,
What Due Diligence Dilemma? Re-envisioning Underwriters' Continuous Due Diligence
after WorldCom, 30 Cardozo L Rev 2001, 2010 (2009), citing In re WorldCom, Inc Securities Litigation,308 F Supp 2d 338, 343 (SDNY 2004).
27 See Thomas Schopflocher, et al, Subprime and Synthetic CDOs: Structure, Risk,
and Valuation *5 (NERA Economic Consulting June 3, 2010), online at http://www.nera
.com/nera-files/PUB_CDOs_StructureRiskValuation0713.pdf (visited Aug 12, 2014).
The credit ratings agency is supposed to grade securities according to their risk, though
this process may have failed in the years leading up to the financial crisis. See Bonander,
98 Iowa L Rev at 841-42 (cited in note 18).
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third-party servicing company,2 8 the special-purpose entity issues bond certificates representing claims against the underlying assets-the pooled mortgages and the attendant payments of
principal and interest by the homebuyers.29 Arrangers, specialpurpose entities, and underwriters are all securities issuers. Institutional and other investors then purchase the certificates,
entitling these investors to payments passed through from the
homebuyers. In simplified form30 the transaction forms a twoway street between homebuyers and institutional investors,
with originators, arrangers, and special-purpose entities paving
the way. Capital flows down the street from cash-rich institutional investors to homebuyers who need financing. Mortgage
payments travel the opposite direction, passing through to investors and, if all goes well, generating a steady return on investment.
Within this transactional structure, originators, arrangers,
and special-purpose entities essentially function as middlemen
between large groups of unwitting homebuyers and end purchasers of mortgage-backed securities. Other than certain fees
extracted along the way, everything a given homebuyer pays toward his or her mortgage passes through to the investor-as do
the risks of default and interest rate fluctuation.31
Where the risk of default is situated matters, especially
when the mortgages backing the security are subprime, because
subprime mortgagors are more likely to default.32 While originators, which are ideally situated to assess borrowers' creditworthiness, 33 are supposed to account for this enhanced risk, the passthrough nature of the transaction34 changes their incentives.
28 See Hynes, 4 Va L & Bus Rev at 239 (cited in note 21). The servicer "collect[s]
payments from the borrower, update[s] account information and pursue[s] delinquent
debtors." Id.
29 See id.
30 Securitization is complex, and a full discussion of it lies outside the scope of this
Comment. For a thorough analysis of securitization, see generally Steven L. Schwarcz,
SecuritizationPost-Enron, 25 Cardozo L Rev 1539 (2004). See also Steven L. Schwarcz,
The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 Stan J L Bus & Fin 133, 135-44 (1994); Adam B.
Ashcraft and Til Schuermann, Understanding the Securitization of Subprime Mortgage
Credit *2-12 (Federal Reserve Bank of NY Staff Reports No 318 Mar 2008), online at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/researchlstaff-reportssr318.pdf (visited Aug 12, 2014).
31 See Moran, 13 NC Bank Inst at 36-37 (cited in note 13) (describing mortgagebacked securities as "pass-through" certificates).
32 See text accompanying notes 16-18.
33 As the only entity in the mortgage-backed security transaction that actually interfaces with and evaluates individual borrowers, originators should be screening out some
potential homebuyers and sorting those who remain based on perceived creditworthiness.
34 See text accompanying note 31.
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Namely, by passing through the risk of default to the investor,
originators obviate the need to be as careful and may even create a perverse incentive to make misrepresentations about a
borrower's ability to repay, at worst. 35 In short, the originator
gets paid regardless of whether the homebuyer ultimately defaults.36 These structural problems are exacerbated when originators exploit their position vis-A-vis borrowers by engaging in
predatory tactics, 37 such as offering low introductory teaser rates
followed by potentially unaffordable variable rates. 38 This tactic
was common prior to the financial crisis and relied on an economic environment conducive to refinancing.39
2. (In)securitization: the financial meltdown.
A perfect storm in the mortgage-backed securities market
catalyzed the financial meltdown of 2007-08, spreading and
amplifying losses associated with borrower default.40 Exogenous
events revealed-too late-flaws inherent in these securities.
The end result was an estimated $2.2 trillion in global banking
losses.41
Mortgage-backed securities pass through risk to investors,
potentially reducing originators' incentives to exercise caution in
lending. 42 In the subprime-mortgage market, which grew explosively from 2001 to 2005, 43 this reduced caution posed a particular
35 See Ashcraft and Schuermann, Understanding the Securitization of Subprime
Mortgage Credit at *5 (cited in note 30). Also, because of an information asymmetry between arrangers and third parties, the mortgage-backed securities market may suffer
from an adverse selection problem: arrangers, which have more information about the
quality of the mortgages, can pass the worst loans off to investors and keep the best
ones. See id at *6.
36 Of course, the originator has countervailing reputational incentives, but those
play out over a longer time horizon and at any rate proved insufficient to prevent the
kind of advantage taking that fueled the financial crisis.
37 See Ashcraft and Schuermann, Understanding the Securitization of Subprime
Mortgage Credit at *5 (cited in note 30).
38 See Bethel, Ferrell, and Hu, Legal and Economic Issues at 167-68 (cited in note 16).
39 See id. Because the initially affordable interest rate would later resetincreasing monthly payments by 15 to 35 percent or more-many subprime borrowers
absolutely needed the option to refinance at a lower rate. Schopflocher, et al, Subprime
and Synthetic CDOs at *11 (cited in note 27).
40 See Federal Crisis Inquiry Commission, PreliminaryStaff Report at *19-20 (cited
in note 17).
41 See International Monetary Fund, Global FinancialStability Report: Sovereigns,
Funding, and Systemic Liquidity *13 (Oct 2010), online at http://www.imf.org/
ExternalPubs/FTIGFSR/2010/02/pdf/text.pdf (visited Aug 12, 2014).
42 See text accompanying notes 30-39.
43 See Bethel, Ferrell, and Hu, Legal and Economic Issues at 167-68 (cited in note 16).
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threat: the granting of loans that were extremely susceptible to
housing price declines because they offered low teaser rates that
later reset to a higher level. 44 One of the most risky and common
subprime mortgages was an adjustable-rate loan dubbed the
"2/28" because it gave the borrower a low, fixed teaser rate for
two years, then reset to a much higher variable rate for the next
twenty-eight. 45 Many subprime borrowers used products like this
expecting their home to appreciate, which would then allow
them to either refinance when their mortgage reset or resell
("flip") their house for a profit.46 What few of these borrowers
contemplated, however, was that if housing prices fell, they
would be unable to refinance or sell and possibly unable to make
their mortgage payments. 47 Because many subprime borrowers
financed nearly the entire value of their home, a price decline
might even leave them "underwater"-owing more than the
4
market value of their home. 8
But in the midst of a housing bubble, 49 overly optimistic borrowers and lenders failed to adequately anticipate price declines. Instead, imbued with irrational exuberance, buyers with
marginal incomes, limited net worth, and poor credit histories
5o
executed unaffordable mortgages, hoping to flip or refinance.
Inevitably, the bubble burst.51 Housing prices peaked in early
2006, then began to decline;52 concurrently, the background interest rate increased, exerting still more pressure on homeowners
whose adjustable-rate mortgages had just reset. 53 Lacking the

44 See Schopflocher, et al, Subprime and Synthetic CDOs at *4 (cited in note 27);
Bethel, Ferrell, and Hu, Legal and Economic Issues at 168 (cited in note 16). See also
text accompanying notes 37-39.
45 See Bethel, Ferrell, and Hu, Legal and Economic Issues at 168 (cited in note 16).
46 See Schopflocher, et al, Subprime and Synthetic CDOs at *11 (cited in note 27).
47 See id.
48 Miller, 80 Fordham L Rev at 276 (cited in note 6).
49 See Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Preliminary Staff Report at *13 (cited
in note 17) (noting that the increase in real housing prices in the United States between
1998 and 2006 was substantially greater than in any earlier time period). A speculative
bubble is a market condition in which the market price of an asset is artificially inflated
from its intrinsic value due to the aggregated poor judgments of investors. See John Patrick
Hunt, Taking Bubbles Seriously in Contract Law, 61 Case W Res L Rev 681, 689-90
(2011).
50 See Bethel, Ferrell, and Hu, Legal and Economic Issues at 177 (cited in note 16).
51 See Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Preliminary Staff Report at *13-14
(cited in note 17).
52 Bethel, Ferrell, and Hu, Legal and Economic Issues at 180 (cited in note 16).
53 Id.
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option to refinance, many subprime borrowers found themselves
54
underwater and facing impossibly high payments.
Thus was the systemic risk 55 posed by mortgage-backed securities realized. Between 2006 and 2009, the national rates of
mortgage-payment delinquencies and home foreclosures skyrocketed.56 Fearful of losing income, investors in mortgagebacked securities sought to enforce repurchase agreements that
required originators to buy back bad mortgages. 57 Overextended
subprime originators lacked the capital to do so, and many were
driven to bankruptcy,58 right along with some prime originators.59 In response, credit ratings agencies began downgrading
mortgage-backed securities, triggering write-downs6 0 at the
trusts holding the impaired assets and requiring these trusts to
raise capital to meet regulatory requirements.61 To do so, they
attempted to sell their mortgage-related assets, flooding the
already-glutted market and driving down prices in a vicious
cycle.62 Ultimately, the entire financial services industry was reorganized, foreclosures spiked, and investors in mortgage63
backed securities lost huge sums of money.

54 See id (noting that mortgage payments for many had risen by as much as 30 percent by February 2008).
55 For a definition of systemic risk, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97
Georgetown L J 193, 204 (2008):
[Systemic risk is] the risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or institutional failure triggers (through a panic or otherwise) either (X) the failure of a
chain of markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to financial
institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its
availability, often evidenced by substantial financial-market price volatility.
56 See Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, PreliminaryStaff Report at *20 (cited
in note 17).
57 See Carrick Mollenkamp, James R. Hagerty, and Randall Smith, Banks Go On
Subprime Offensive: HSBC, Others, Try to Force Struggling Smaller Players to Buy Back
Their Loans, Wall St J A3 (Mar 13, 2007).
58 See Bethel, Ferrell, and Hu, Legal and Economic Issues at 182 (cited in note 16).
59 See Associated Press, American Home Mortgage Seeks Chapter 11 Bankruptcy
Protection, NY Times C3 (Aug 7, 2007); Kemba J. Dunham, Subprime Woes Slap Other
Lenders: Share Prices Tumble for Mortgage REITs Regardless of Exposure, Wall St J B7
(Mar 14, 2007).
60 A "write-down" is a reduction in the book value of an asset to reflect market conditions. See John Clark, International Dictionary of Insurance and Finance 338
(Glenlake 1999). With mortgage-backed securities in a tailspin, large write-downs signaled firms' financial distress and exacerbated the sell-off. See Miller, 80 Fordham L Rev
at 278-79 (cited in note 6).
61 See Bethel, Ferrell, and Hu, Legal and Economic Issues at 182-84 (cited in note 16).
62 See id at 183.
63 See id at 173. See also Moran, 13 NC Bank Inst at 84-85 (cited in note 13).
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When the Smoke Cleared: Suing to Recoup Losses

The following two sections provide a summary of relevant
securities law and the issuing documents that it requires. Part
I.B.1 covers the statutory regime usually invoked by plaintiffs in
mortgage-backed securities class actions. Part I.B.2 describes the
interaction of two types of documents mandated by that regime.
1. Governing securities law.
In the wake of the financial meltdown, securities-fraud class
actions have proliferated, typically alleging that the offering
documents contained misstatements or omissions.64 Under §§ 11,
12, and 15 of the Securities Act of 193365 ('33 Act), a plaintiff has
a cause of action for securities fraud if he or she: (1) purchased a
security, (2) relied on a materially fraudulent statement, and (3)
the security decreased in value.66 Specifically, the '33 Act imposes
liability for false or misleading statements contained in registration statements, 67 prospectuses, 6s or oral communications,69 and
extends liability to anyone who "controls any person [so] liable."70 This is a strict liability cause of action, hinging on the mere
existence of a fraudulent statement in the offering documents,
rather than the issuers' intent at the time that they produced
71
those documents.
In the context of mortgage-backed securities class actions,
plaintiffs usually allege that risks associated with the loan underwriting practices or the loans themselves-all pertaining to
underlying conduct by originators-were not properly disclosed
by the arrangers, trusts, and underwriters (collectively, the

64 See, for example, Maine State Retirement System v Countrywide FinancialCorp,
722 F Supp 2d 1157, 1161 (CD Cal 2010); In re Wells Fargo Mortgage-Backed Certificates
Litigation, 712 F Supp 2d 958, 962 (ND Cal 2010); In re IndyMac Mortgage-Backed SecuritiesLitigation, 718 F Supp 2d 495, 498 (SDNY 2010).
65 Pub L No 73-22, 48 Stat 74, codified as amended at 15 USC § 77a et seq.
66 '33 Act §§ 11, 12, 15, 48 Stat at 82-84, codified at 15 USC §§ 77k(a), 77l(a)(2), 77o.
67 '33 Act § 11, 48 Stat at 82, codified at 15 USC § 77k(a).
68 '33 Act § 12, 48 Stat at 84, codified at 15 USC § 771(a)(2).
69 '33 Act § 12, 48 Stat at 84, codified at 15 USC § 77l(a)(2).
70 '33 Act § 15, 48 Stat at 84, codified at 15 USC § 77o.
71
See In re Lehman Brothers Securities and ERISA Litigation, 684 F Supp 2d 485,
494 (SDNY 2010) ("[Defendants] are strictly liable for any misstatements in the Offering
Documents that they signed unless they can establish the due diligence defense.");
NECA-IBEW Health & Welfare Fund v Goldman Sachs & Co, 693 F3d 145, 148 (2d Cir
2012) ("[These sections] impose essentially strict liability for material misstatements
contained in registered securities offerings.").
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issuers).72 Although their actions form the basis for the allegations of fraud, originators are not liable under the aforementioned sections of the '33 Act. Rather, the '33 Act targets entities
responsible for producing the misleading offering documents73
arrangers, trusts, and underwriters.
For instance, imagine that in 2006 a plaintiff bought a
mortgage-backed security from a group of issuers. The issuers
stated in the offering documents that "all originators determined
that borrowers have a monthly income sufficient to meet their
mortgage obligations." After the financial crisis and a precipitate
drop in the security's value, it comes to light that the originators
failed to verify many homebuyers' incomes. This bad underlying
conduct by the originators renders the statement in the offering
documents-which the issuers drafted-false. Under the '33 Act,
the plaintiff now has a cause of action against the issuers, but
not the originators. 74 And because the claim is one of strict liability, 75 the plaintiff need not prove that the issuers acted with
knowledge of the originators' bad underlying conduct.
2. Offering documents: shelf registration statements and
supplemental prospectuses.
Allegedly misleading statements usually occur in shelf registration statements and supplemental prospectuses. 76 A shelf
registration statement is a statutory construct that facilitates
the issuance of securities, 77 but it also creates a complication
that lies at the core of this Comment. Governing multiple separate security issuances,
The shelf registration statement includes a "base" or "core"
prospectus that typically contains general information, including the types of securities to be offered and a description of
the risk factors of the offering. It will generally not include
transaction-specific details-such as pricing information, or

72 See, for example, NECA-IBEW, 693 F3d at 151-54.
73 '33 Act §§ 11, 12, 48 Stat at 82-83, codified at 15 USC §§ 77k(a), 771(a)(2).
74 Of course, the plaintiff still has to establish all three elements of the claim. See
text accompanying note 66.
75 See note 71.
76 Oral misstatements are technically also covered but are rarely at issue in these
cases. See 15 USC § 771(a)(2).
77 It does so by allowing issuers to create a boilerplate template for many different
offerings. See NECA-IBEW, 693 F3d at 150. Supplemental prospectuses, on the other
hand, must be made anew for each offering. See id at 150-51.

1090

The University of Chicago Law Review

[81:1079

information regarding the specific assets to be included in
the vehicle from which the securities are issued.78
It enables qualified issuers to continually offer securities by writing and filing a shelf registration statement covering all offerings.
Originators do not author a registration statement, although
their underlying conduct bears on its content.
Issuers then supplement the shared registration statement
with prospectuses unique to each offering.79 Supplemental prospectuses do contain transaction-specific details and are narrowly
tailored to each offering.80 These supplements are deemed to create new registration statements particular to each offering,
which are distinct from shelf registration statements. 81 This
package-shelf registration statement plus supplemental prospectus-constitutes the offering documents for a given issuance
82
and explains in detail the characteristics of the underlying assets.
Thus, while an identical shelf registration statement may subsume different offerings of mortgage-backed securities, the final
"registration statement," as contemplated by the statutory language, 83 integrates a unique prospectus that focuses in greater
detail on the particular loans and their respective risks8s This
critical distinction engenders the conflict this Comment covers. 85
C.

Standing and Class Actions

Because class actions often result in settlement, threshold
procedural questions carry special significance and may dramatically affect potential liability or even be dispositive of the litigation.86 Class action standing doctrine can decide the crucial

78

79
80

Id at 150 (citation omitted).
See 17 CFR § 230.415(a)(6).
See NECA-IBEW, 693 F3d at 150.

81 See 17 CFR § 229.512(a)(1)-(2). See also Finkel v Stratton Corp, 962 F2d 169,
174 (2d Cir 1992). Shelf registration statements--as opposed to just registration statements-are a presupplement document.
82 See Plumbers' Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v Nomura Asset Acceptance
Corp, 632 F3d 762, 766 (1st Cir 2011).
83
15 USC § 77b(a)(8) ('The term 'registration statement' means the statement provided for in section 77f of this title, and includes any amendment thereto and any report,
document, or memorandum filed as part of such statement or incorporated therein by
reference.").
84 See NECA.IBEW, 693 F3d at 158.
85 For more on shelf registration statements, see Finkel, 962 F2d at 174.
86 See FRCP 23(f), Advisory Committee Notes to the 1998 Amendments (suggesting
that denial of certification effectively bars appellate review and ends the litigation, while
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questions of whether and how a class ultimately proceeds. This
Section will first discuss standing in general and then narrow in
on class actions.
1. Standing generally.
Standing is a threshold question that determines a federal
7
court's Article III power to adjudicate a given controversy. In
order to establish standing, a plaintiff must show that she has:
(1) personally suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable
to a defendant's alleged misconduct, and (3) that can be redressed by the court. 88 The first requirement, most relevant
here, dictates that a plaintiff must have experienced "an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized ... and (b) actual or imminent."9 By making this
necessary showing, a plaintiff satisfies Article III's case or controversy requirementO and exhibits a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation.91 This assures the court that the plaintiff is
the proper party to present the claim "in an adversarial context
and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial
resolution."92
Standing doctrine is thought to serve several purposes
lumped under "the idea of separation of powers." 93 This "idea,

its grant may force a defendant to settle rather than incurring the cost of defending and
risking ruinous liability).
87 Warth v Seldin, 422 US 490, 498 (1975). This doctrine, both as applied to class
actions and generally, has been criticized by many commentators, who suggest that it be
used sparingly for several reasons. First, it is inconsistently invoked. See, for example,
Daniel D. DeVougas, Note, Without a Leg to Stand On? Class Representatives, Federal
Courts, and Standing Desiderata,97 Cornell L Rev 627, 636 (2012); James Keenley,
Comment, How Many Injuries Does It Take? Article III Standing in the Class Action Context, 95 Cal L Rev 849, 850 (2007). Second, judges may capitalize on this doctrinal uncertainty by using standing to dodge difficult questions. See Richard J. Pierce Jr, Is Standing
Law or Politics?, 77 NC L Rev 1741, 1762 (1999). Standing doctrine has even been
referred to as "a word game played by secret rules." Flast v Cohen, 392 US 83, 129 (1968)
(Harlan dissenting).
88
See Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555, 560-61 (1992).
89 Id at 560 (quotation marks omitted).
90 The case or controversy requirement refers to the constitutional grant of jurisdiction over all federal cases and controversies between certain enumerated parties. US
Const Art III, § 2, cl 1.
91 See Baker v Carr,369 US 186, 204-08 (1962).
92 Flast, 392 US at 101. In other words, the personal harm element "ensur[es] that
litigants are truly adverse ...ensuring that the people most directly concerned are able
to litigate the questions at issue." William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98
Yale L J 221, 222 (1988).
93 Allen v Wright, 468 US 737, 752 (1984).
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which is more than an intuition but less than a rigorous and explicit theory, [is] about the constitutional and prudential limits
to the powers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our
kind of government. 94 Absent a standing screen, Supreme Court
jurisprudence suggests three possible ways that courts might infringe on the powers of other branches or otherwise overstep
their constitutional bounds: (1) by presiding over nonadversarial
cases, which are outside Article III's grant of authority; (2) by
adjudicating controversies that are more properly decided elsewhere in the political system; and (3) by allowing Congress to
conscript the judiciary in battles against the executive branch.9 5
Aside from these constitutional concerns, some commentators argue that standing doctrine also serves a number of practical functions. Some examples include: (1) reducing judicial costs
97
by screening access, 96 (2) reducing private litigation expenses,
(3) ensuring vigorous advocacy,98 and (4) avoiding collusive
suits.99 These practical functions of standing surface in the
mortgage-backed securities class action context. For instance,
the question addressed by this Comment directly bears on both
the public and private costs of class action securities litigation. A
strict class standing rule might prevent some plaintiffs from entering court at all, reducing public costs as well as defendants'
litigation expenses, whereas a more permissive rule would likely
have the opposite effect. Likewise, if class standing ensures adequate representation long before certification, a stricter application of standing would have similar effects. That is, it would be
like applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4)100 earlier
in the litigation-before the costly discovery and motions practice related to class certification. 101
In sum, standing is meant to ensure that the plaintiff is the
right person to air the grievance and will vigorously prosecute
the case. In addition to constitutional standing doctrine, "the
Supreme Court has also recognized 'statutory standing' and
94

95
96

Vander Jagt v O'Neill, 699 F2d 1166, 1179 (DC Cir 1983) (Bork concurring).
See Heather Elliott, The Functionsof Standing,61 Stan L Rev 459, 468 (2008).
See Kenneth E. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis,

86 Harv L Rev 645, 672-73 (1973).
97 See id at 673-74.
98

See Karl S. Coplan, IdeologicalPlaintiffs,Administrative Lawmaking, Standing,

and the Petition Clause, 61 Me L Rev 377, 424-25 (2009).
99 See id at 425.
100 FRCP 23(a)(4) requires that class representatives "fairly and adequately protect
the interests" of putative class members.
101 See text accompanying notes 258-59.
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'prudential standing.'12 The former "refers to standing afforded
to certain plaintiffs via legislative fiat.1o3 The latter denotes the
"judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as the general prohibition on a litigant's raising another
person's legal rights."104 Prudential standing has an uneasy relationship with the class action, which depends on a named plaintiff litigating on behalf of others. Although "formulated at a high
level of generality,105 standing is an important preliminary jurisdictional hurdle that protects our government's separation of
powers, screens out potentially ineffective or collusive plaintiffs,
and affects the public and private costs of litigation.
2. Class action standing.
By appointing one or more named plaintiffs to represent the
interests of absent parties, class actions chafe against traditional
notions of standing. This collision occurs along two general lines:
multiple defendants 106 and multiple claims. The friction addressed
in this Comment arises from a mixture of these two tensions.
A pair of broad approaches to class action standing emerges
from the case law: the strict model and the permissive model.
The strict model requires named plaintiffs to establish personal
standing as to each claim asserted by the class. It defines the
judicial power in terms of the particularized injuries before the
court, 07 such that the elements of standing-injury in fact, causation, and redressability-constitute an "irreducible constitutional minimum."10 Blum v Yaretsky °9 exemplifies this interpretive viewpoint. The named plaintiffs, nursing home patients
102 DeVougas, Note, 97 Cornell L Rev at 634 (cited in note 87).
103 Id.
104 Allen, 468 US at 751. For further discussion of third-party standing, see Marc
Rohr, Fightingfor the Rights of Others: The Troubled Law of Third-Party Standing and
Mootness in the Federal Courts, 35 U Miami L Rev 393, 396-441 (1981) (examining the
development and status of third-party standing in the federal courts).
105 Fletcher, 98 Yale L J at 223 (cited in note 92).
106 For instance, distinct legal entities may engage in illegal practices that are guided
by a single, uniform policy. Payton v County of Kane, 308 F3d 673 (7th Cir 2002), is illustrative. A class of former arrestees challenged nineteen counties' practice of imposing a
bail fee as a condition of release, but the named plaintiffs had individual claims against
only two counties. Id at 675-77. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of standing.
Id at 677. The Seventh Circuit reversed, assessing standing "with reference to the class
as a whole." Id at 680.
107 See Matthew R. Ford, Adequacy and the Public Rights Model of the Class Action
after Gratz v. Bollinger, 27 Yale L & Pol Rev 1, 8-9 (2008).
108 Lujan, 504 US at 560.
109 457 US 991 (1982).
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receiving Medicaid benefits, had been transferred to a lower level
of care, allegedly without adequate notice or an administrative
hearing.110 However, they also sought to include in their class
patients who had been transferred to a higher level of care."'
With respect to this latter group, the Supreme Court determined
that the representatives lacked standing, because "[none] of the
individual respondents have been either transferred to more intensive care or threatened with such transfers.112 The Court

stated, "a plaintiff who has been subject to injurious conduct of
one kind [does not] possess by virtue of that injury the necessary
stake in litigating conduct of another kind, although similar, to
which he has not been subject."113

Naturally, the permissive model takes a more expansive
view of class action standing. In this paradigm, named plaintiffs
need not allege a personal injury as to each claim asserted by
the class. Rather, their claims can simply be similar to those of
the class. An example can be found in Gratz v Bollinger.11 The
named plaintiffs, both white, were denied admission to the University of Michigan's College of Literature, Science, and the
Arts; had they been minorities, as defined by the school, their
academic records would have qualified them for automatic admission under the school's admissions guidelines. 115 On behalf of
a class consisting both of those who had already been prejudiced
by the admissions guidelines and those who prospectively might
be, the plaintiffs alleged Title VI and Fourteenth Amendment
violations.116 In dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that

the named plaintiffs lacked standing because they were contesting
the freshman admissions policy, yet they could only ever be subject to the transfer policy.117 The majority disagreed, stating that
"the University's use of race in undergraduate transfer admissions
does not implicate a significantly different set of concerns than

110 Id at 995-96.
111 Id at 997.
112 Id at 1001.

113 Blum, 457 US at 999. For another example of the strict model applied to a class
action, see Lewis v Casey, 518 US 343, 358 (1996) (deciding that, rather than having the
power to remedy all of the claimed inadequacies of legal assistance available in a prison,
the Court could rule only on those related to the prison's failure to accommodate illiterate inmates, like the class representative).
114 539 US 244 (2003).

115 Id at 251-54.
116 Id at 252-53.

117 See id at 284-87 (Stevens dissenting).
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does its use of race in undergraduate freshman admissions."118 In
essence, the Court found that the plaintiffs had standing because
"the same set of concerns [was] implicated by the University's use
'
of race in evaluating all undergraduate admissions applications."119
II. STANDING APART: THE GREAT DIVIDE
As courts adjudicate claims arising from the financial meltdown, disagreement has grown over how to treat class action
standing in the context of mortgage-backed securities fraud. It is
undisputed that lead plaintiffs lack standing to raise claims on
their own behalf regarding securities that they did not personally
purchase.120 Under a strict model, the story ends there-if a
named plaintiff cannot establish personal standing as to each
claim, then he or she lacks standing to pursue those claims for
the class. However, if it is alleged that a shelf registration
statement common to a batch of securities is fraudulent, thus
implicating the same set of concerns across many securities offerings, the permissive model calls for expanding the conventional scope of standing. This Part, which discusses the circuit
split between courts embracing these competing models, comprises three sections. The first discusses the First Circuit's position, which confines class action standing to the particularized
injuries suffered by the named plaintiff. The second considers
the permissive approach taken by the Second Circuit. The last
explores the practical significance of this distinction.
A.

The First Circuit's Strict Model

Most courts to consider this issue have held that a named
plaintiff lacks standing to represent the interests of investors in
mortgage-backed securities that the named plaintiff did not personally purchase.121 These courts reason that such plaintiffs
have suffered no injury from securities that they did not purchase and therefore have no stake in the litigation of claims
Gratz, 539 US at 265.
119 Id at 267 (emphasis added). For another example of the permissive model, see
Flast, 392 US at 105-06 (holding that taxpayers had standing to raise claims about allegedly unconstitutional governmental conduct despite a relatively negligible interest in
the tax revenue supporting it).
120 See NECA-IBEW Health & Welfare Fund v Goldman Sachs & Co, 693 F3d 145,
158 (2d Cir 2012) ("[The plaintiff] clearly lacks standing to assert such claims on its behalf because it did not purchase those Certificates.").
121 See, for example, Maine State Retirement System v Countrywide FinancialCorp,
722 F Supp 2d 1157, 1163 n 6 (CD Cal 2010) (collecting cases).
118
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related to those securities. However, the First Circuit is thus far
the only federal court of appeals to adopt this position, and it did
so somewhat reservedly.
That opinion was handed down in Plumbers' Union Local
No. 12 Pension Fund v Nomura Asset Acceptance Corp.122 The
named plaintiffs bought mortgage-backed securities from two of
the eight defendant trusts, all of which shared two shelf registration statements. 123 The trusts were organized by a single
arranger-Nomura, the lead defendant-but were backed by
loans from different mixes of originators and had different supplemental prospectuses.124 During the financial crisis, the certificates issued by all eight trusts were downgraded and lost substantial value.125 Representing a class of purchasers from all
eight trusts, the plaintiffs sued on the theory that the registration statements contained false or misleading information about
the mortgage-underwriting guidelines, property-appraisal prac6
tices, and investment ratings.12
The court began its analysis by acknowledging the uncertainty surrounding class action standing.127 It stated that class
representatives "regularly litigate not only their own claims but
also claims of other class members based on transactions in
which the named plaintiffs played no part."128 The First Circuit
observed that the Supreme Court's holdings on class action standing are inconsistent and that several circuits have departed from
the strict posture, allowing classes to proceed when "the claims
are essentially of the same character as the claim against a
properly named defendant.129
After wrestling with this ambiguity, the First Circuit made
an important qualification, giving some ground to the permissive model:
The qualification, on which we reserve judgment, is one
where the claims of the named plaintiffs necessarily give
them-not just their lawyers-essentially the same incentive
to litigate the counterpart claims of the class members because
122

632 F3d 762 (1st Cir 2011).

123

Id at 766.

124

Id.

125

Id.

126

Nomura, 632 F3d at 766-67, 772-76.
See id at 768 ("The issue looks straightforward and one would expect it to be well

127

settled; neither assumption is entirely true.").
128 Id at 769.
129

Id at 769-70.
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the establishment of the named plaintiffs' claims necessarily
establishes those of other class members. The matter is one
of identity of issues not in the abstract but at a ground floor
level. In such a case,... the substance of the Article III concern may vanish even if in form it might seem to persist.130
Despite this qualification, and despite the fact that "a handful of district court cases have allowed securities claims to proceed in situations that may fit the possible exception we have
outlined above," the First Circuit ultimately affirmed dismissal
of the claims against the six trusts from which the named plaintiffs had not purchased.31 It determined that the "identity of issues
and alignment of incentives" required to trigger the potential
exception were not present, because each trust was backed by
loans from a different mix of originators.132 The court required
that securities purchased by class members be backed by a mix
of originators identical to that in offerings purchased by the
named plaintiffs. 133 This holding illustrates the strict model of
standing: the court dismissed all claims related to trusts from
which the named plaintiffs did not buy.13 And since two separate offerings will rarely have an identical originator mix, 135 the
First Circuit essentially limited class standing to the particularized injuries suffered by the lead plaintiffs-thereby enshrining
the traditional, narrow notion of standing.
Various district courts have dismissed similar claims on the
basis of the strict model, rejecting the position that a flaw in the
common registration statement implicates the same fundamental
issues for all purchasers.136 Often citing each other, these opinions

130
131

Nomura, 632 F3d at 770 (emphasis added).

Id at 771.

Id.
See id at 770-71.
134 See Nomura, 632 F3d at 771.
135 Arrangers aggregate a large portfolio of mortgages from different originators, then
subdivide it into separate offerings and lots within those offerings. See Bethel, Ferrell, and
Hu, Legal and Economic Issues at 170 (cited in note 16).
136 For examples of cases holding that named plaintiffs have class standing only
with respect to the securities that they personally purchased, see In re IndyMac MortgageBacked Securities Litigation, 718 F Supp 2d 495, 501 (SDNY 2010); In re Lehman Brothers
Securities and ERISA Litigation, 684 F Supp 2d 485, 490-91 (SDNY 2010); Massachusetts Bricklayers and Masons Funds and Pipefitters' Retirement Fund Local 598 v
Deutsche Alt-A Securities, 2010 WL 1370962, *1 (EDNY); City of Ann Arbor Employees'
Retirement System v Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust Inc, 703 F Supp 2d 253, 260-61
(EDNY 2010); Public Employees' Retirement System of Mississippi v Merrill Lynch & Co,
714 F Supp 2d 475, 480-81 (SDNY 2010); Maine State Retirement System, 722 F Supp 2d
132

133
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generally reason as follows: (1) in order to establish Article III
standing, named plaintiffs must show personal injury per traditional standing analysis; (2) because each supplemental prospectus is deemed to create a new registration statement, the argument that all offerings share a common shelf registration fails;
and (3) furthermore, the named plaintiffs lack statutory standing with respect to securities that they did not purchase because
§§ 11 and 12 of the '33 Act grant a cause of action to only the
person actually acquiring a particular security. 137 This reasoning
turns on distinguishing a shelf registration statement, applicable to a batch of securities, from a final registration statement
138
created by filing a supplemental prospectus.
Courts justify this distinction on the basis of both the statutory language and the fact that the representations made in
supplemental prospectuses are unique. 139 Two provisions of the
'33 Act are commonly drawn on: the section treating supple140
mental prospectuses as creating new registration statements,
and the passage stating that "any person acquiring such security
...may... sue."'1' The former, it is argued, undermines the notion that a shelf registration is truly common to all offerings it
covers, while the latter implies that a purchaser may sue regarding only securities that he or she acquired. As to the claim
that supplemental prospectuses contain unique information, recall that they "focus[] on the specific loans underlying each offering and the specific underwriting standards and origination
practices in effect at the time those specific loans were originated,"142 while shelf registration statements are "general in

at 1163-64; In re Wells Fargo Mortgage-Backed CertificatesLitigation, 712 F Supp 2d
958, 963-64 (ND Cal 2010).
137 See, for example, Wells Fargo Mortgage-Backed Certificates, 712 F Supp 2d at

964-65; Lehman Brothers Securities, 684 F Supp 2d at 490-91; Maine State Retirement
System, 722 F Supp 2d at 1164 ("For the reasons stated in [Wells FargoMortgage-Backed
Certificates] and [Lehman Brothers Securities], Plaintiffs have standing only with respect
to the [offerings] in which the named plaintiffs purchased.").
138 When an offering is made pursuant to a common registration statement with a
supplemental prospectus, "each such post-effective amendment shall be deemed to be a
new registration statement relating to the securities offered therein." 17 CFR
§ 229.512(a)(2). In other words, the representations in the shelf registration statement
are deemed to be repeated in the new registration statement, and mingle with those in
the supplemental prospectus.
139 See, for example, Maine State Retirement System, 722 F Supp 2d at 1164.
140 See note 138.
141 15 USC § 77k(a).
142 Maine State Retirement System, 722 F Supp 2d at 1164.
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content" and "point investors to specific details contained in the
supplements."143
B.

The Second Circuit's Permissive Model

The Second Circuit recently made an apparently momentous
break from precedent,144 transplanting the permissive model exemplified by Gratz into the realm of securities law. It developed
a new method of determining when a lead plaintiff may bring
claims regarding securities that he or she did not personally
purchase. However, like the First Circuit in Nomura, the Second
Circuit qualified its holding.
The facts of NECA-IBEW Health & Welfare Fund v Goldman Sachs & Co145 read much like those in Nomura. The named
plaintiff bought certificates from two of seventeen offerings
made pursuant to the same shelf registration statement. 146 Each
offering was issued by a separate trust, which were all arranged
by Goldman Sachs, 147 and backed by loans from different mixes of
originators.148 Accordingly, the final offering documents included
supplemental prospectuses unique to each security. 149 After the
certificates' ratings were downgraded in 2008, they lost much of
their value.150 Representing a class of purchasers from all seventeen trusts, the plaintiff sued on the theory that the offering
documents-including the common shelf registration statement-contained false or misleading information about the
mortgage-underwriting guidelines, property-appraisal standards, and securities' ratings.15
The district court, explicitly following the First Circuit's position in Nomura, dismissed the named plaintiffs claims concerning
the fifteen trusts from which it had not purchased securities; the
judge rejected the argument that all buyers were subject to the
same misrepresentations via a common shelf registration

143 New Jersey Carpenters Vacation Fund v Royal Bank of Scotland Group, PLC, 720
F Supp 2d 254, 265 (SDNY 2010).
144 It is significant that this circuit-which contains New York City, the hub of American
finance-chose to revamp standing analysis in mortgage-backed securities class actions, especially after so many contrary decisions from its district courts (see note 136).
145 693 F3d 145 (2d Cir 2012).
146 Id at 149.
147 Id.
148 Id at 153.
149 NECA-IBEW, 693 F3d at 153.
150 Id at 153-54.
151 Id at 151.
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statement. 152 On review after appeal, the Second Circuit began
its analysis by differentiating between ordinary standing and
class standing. 153 Then it noted "tension" in Supreme Court precedent.54 However, the Second Circuit did not stop there: it also
thoroughly reviewed each of the seminal cases representing the
strict and permissive models. 1 5 From these, particularly Gratz,
it distilled a preliminary method for determining class action
standing: inquiring whether defendants' conduct implicates "the
same set of concerns" as the conduct alleged to have caused injury
to other members of the putative class by the same defendants.156
Applying this formula, the Second Circuit rejected the idea
that standing cannot exist under a common shelf registration
statement merely because it has been supplemented by unique
prospectuses. 157 After all, the court reasoned:
The fact that those representations appeared in separate
Offering Documents ... does not by itself raise "a number of
fundamentally different concerns," because the location of
the representations has no effect on a given purchaser's assertion that the representation was misleading ... just as
[in Gratz] the difference in the University of Michigan's
transfer and freshman admissions policies had no effect on
the University's assertion that diversity was a compelling
state interest. 158
Additionally, the misstatements in the supplemental prospectuses were "nearly identical."159 Reading this language alone,
one would think that the court simply embraced the permissive
model wholesale.
But, as in Nomura, the Second Circuit qualified its holding.
Importantly, the court ultimately allowed the class to proceed
against only seven of the seventeen trusts. 1 0 Recognizing the
complexity of these transactions,11 the court limited class standing
See id at 154.
NECA-IBEW, 693 F3d at 158.
154 Id at 160.
155 See id at 160-62. These cases were discussed in Part I.C.2 and will be scrutinized further in Part III.A.
156 NECA-IBEW, 693 F3d at 162.
157 See id.
158 Id at 162-63 (citation omitted).
159 Id at 163.
160 NECA-IBEW, 693 F3d at 164.
161 See id at 163 ("[Class members] bought Certificates issued through 17 separate
Offerings, each backed by a distinct set of loans issued by a distinct set of originators.'.
152

153
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to participants in offerings backed by loans from originators
common to the two offerings from which the named plaintiff had
purchased certificates.162 Such a distinction was necessary, the
court explained, because "differences in the identity of the originators backing the Certificates matters for the purposes of
assessing whether those claims raise the same set of concerns.163

In short, claims against two or more offerings that lack

any overlapping originators would draw on very different
proof. 164

To illustrate this approach, imagine two offerings, both covered by the same shelf registration statement: offering 1, with
originators A and B; and offering 2, with originators C and D. If
the named plaintiff has purchased only from offering 1, he or she
must prove that originator A or B has engaged in underlying
conduct, such as failing to verify borrower income, 161 that renders offering l's documents false or misleading. Showing bad
underlying conduct on the part of C or D-which would matter
to buyers from offering 2-will not avail the named plaintiff.
Thus, it makes little sense to create a class of purchasers from
offerings 1 and 2, even if those offerings' shelf registration
statements are otherwise identical.
At least four different courts have followed NECA-IBEW.166
Interestingly, several district courts have gone even further,
162 See id at 164. The Second Circuit's approach will be referred to as the "commonoriginator test."
163 Id at 163.
164 See NECA-IBEW, 693 F3d at 163.
165 See text accompanying notes 72-75.
166 See New Jersey Carpenters Health Fund v Royal Bank of Scotland Group, PLC,
709 F3d 109, 128 (2d Cir 2013) (vacating dismissal of claims in a mortgage-backed securities class action and remanding the case for reconsideration under the NECA-IBEW
standard); New Jersey Carpenters Health Fund, New Jersey CarpentersVacation Fund v
Residential Capital, LLC, 2013 WL 6669966, *3 (SDNY) (rejecting an interpretation of
NECA-IBEW that would require a common shelf registration to implicate the "same set
of concerns"); New Jersey Carpenters Health Fund v DLJ Mortgage Capital, Inc, 2013
WL 357615, -1-9 (SDNY) (granting in part the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration in
light of NECA-IBEW and finding that the Second Circuit's test expands the plaintiffs
class standing); Plumbers' & Pipefitters'Local No. 562 Supplemental Plan & Trust v J.P.
Morgan Acceptance Corp I, 2012 WL 4053716, *1 (EDNY) (applying the NECA-IBEW
test in a mortgage-backed securities class action). See also Gates v UnitedHealth Group
Inc, 2014 WL 1316928, *4 (2d Cir) (suggesting that a plaintiff might be able to bring
"claims on behalf of the beneficiaries of other [health insurance] plans ... in light of this
Court's decision in [NECA-IBE W"); Plumbers & Pipefitters National Pension Fund v
Burns, 967 F Supp 2d 1143, 1164 (ND Ohio 2013) (applying the NECA-IBEW test in a
securities-fraud class action and concluding that it permits stockholders to assert claims on
behalf of bondholders); In re Frito-Lay North America, Inc All Natural Litigation, 2013 WL
4647512, -10-13 (EDNY) (applying NECA-IBEW in the context of a consumer-fraud class
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allowing claims against all offerings made under an allegedly
fraudulent shelf registration statement to proceed, regardless of
originator mix. In In re Countrywide Financial Corp Securities
Litigation,167 the Central District of California parsed the language of § 11 of the '33 Act to distinguish between "registration
statement" as used there and as used elsewhere, suggesting that
the statute grants a named plaintiff standing to represent anyone who buys a security traceable to a common defective shelf
registration statement. 168 In In re CitiGroup Inc Bond Litigation,169 the Southern District of New York extended this position
to a class action alleging that the shelf registration statement
common to a batch of mortgage-backed collateralized debt obligations 170 (CDOs) was fraudulent. 171 In that case, after explicitly
adopting the conclusion from In re Countrywide, the court held
that "where the actionable part of the registration statement is
alleged to be common to all purchasers from the same shelf,
then a plaintiff has standing to represent them."172 And again, in
In re American International Group, Inc 2008 Securities Litigation173 ("AIG"), the same district court reached a similar result,
this time distinguishing between alleged misstatements in supplemental prospectuses and in a common shelf registration
statement. 74 Recently, this court went the furthest yet in New
Jersey CarpentersHealth Fund, New Jersey Carpenters Vacation
Fund v Residential Capital, LLC, 175 liberally interpreting NECAIBEWs "same set of concerns" language to require only common
originators, not necessarily even a shared shelf registration

action). But see Oklahoma Police Pension and Retirement System v U.S. Bank National
Association, 2013 WL 6508843, *5 (SDNY) (declining to apply NECA-IBEW to sweep in
entirely different species of claims that resulted in allegedly similar injury). For a
lengthy criticism of NECA-IBEW from a court in another circuit, see FDIC v Countrywide
FinancialCorp, 2012 WL 5900973, *9-12 (CD Cal).
167 588 F Supp 2d 1132 (CD Cal 2008).
168 Id at 1165.
169 723 F Supp 2d 568 (SDNY 2010).
170 CDOs are a type of asset-backed security similar to mortgage-backed securities.
CDOs are backed not just by mortgages, but also by other receivables owned by the specialpurpose entity. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting FinancialMarkets: Lessons from the
Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 93 Minn L Rev 373, 376 (2008). For purposes of this Comment, CDOs can be collapsed into the term "mortgage-backed securities." See note 10.
171 See In re CitiGroup,723 F Supp 2d at 584-85.
172 Id at 584.
173 741 F Supp 2d 511 (SDNY 2010).
174 See id at 537-38.
175 2013 WL 6669966 (SDNY).
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statement. 1 6 Noting that "there was no language [in NECAIBEW] finding that a shared registration statement was an essential element of the 'same set of concerns' requirement," Judge
Harold Baer held that common originators plus substantial textual similarity in offering documents satisfies the class standing
analysis.177
C.

Why Does It Matter?

A class action's utility lies partly in organizing a large group
of discrete claimants, solving collective action problems that
they might otherwise face.178 Yet mortgage-backed securities
cases typically involve sophisticated plaintiffs with much at
stake, who theoretically might be willing to sue in smaller classes
or even singly, subject to the lead plaintiff appointment provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.179
In this environment, will claims reach court one way or the other,
rendering this topic moot? Not necessarily. Aside from statutory
guidelines for determining who is the "most adequate plaintiff,"180 economic considerations limit the potential for circumventing this question.
First, even for large institutional investors, the potential increase in claim size yielded by a more inclusive class can be profound-in NECA-IBEW, for instance, granting standing to claims
against just five additional offerings, out of a total of seventeen,'81
meant the difference between a possible recovery of less than
$500,000 and several billion dollars.182 Had the First Circuit's
strict model controlled NECA-IBEW instead, the class would
have been restricted to pursuing claims worth only $500,000likely not enough to justify litigation expenses.183 Second, the
identity of the lead plaintiff will greatly affect potential liability
for similar reasons. It is extremely unlikely that any one investor,
176

See id at *3.

177

Id.

See Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'Attorney'sRole in
Class Action and Derivative Litigation:Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U Chi L Rev 1, 8-9 (1991).
179 Pub L No 104-67, 109 Stat 737, codified in various sections of Title 15.
180 15 USC § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I).
181 NECA-IBEW, 693 F3d at 149.
182 See Goldman Petition at *27 (cited in note 11).
183 Mortgage-backed securities class actions tend to require extensive discovery. See,
for example, Maine State Retirement System v Countrywide Financial Corp, 2013 WL
6577020, *15 (CD Cal) (involving six years of discovery and the production of nearly ten
million pages of documents).
178
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or even several, will have bought all the securities covered by a
given shelf registration statement. 184 Again taking NECA-IBEW
as an example, the lead plaintiff, presumably the class member
with the largest financial stake in the relief sought,185 had actually purchased from only two out of seventeen offerings.186 Relaxing traditional standing requirements more than tripled the
number of different offerings that the plaintiff could represent
claims against.187 In short, restructuring litigation, either
through attempting to cherry-pick lead plaintiffs or split up the
class, will not avoid the question under discussion.
III. SCREENING FOR STANDING: A TwO-STEP TEST

This Part, which proposes a solution to the circuit split, includes two sections. The first suggests that Nomura and NECAIBEW are each, perhaps unknowingly, anchored to a critical,
unexplored middle ground that lies between the strict and permissive models that they exemplify. The second, drawing from
this newly charted realm, articulates a test for class action
standing in the mortgage-backed securities context.
A.

Finding a Common Ground between the Split

At first blush, the strict and permissive models of class action standing employed in Nomura and NECA-IBEW seem diametrically opposed. Indeed, the courts reach opposite outcomes
on nearly identical facts and cite different cases to get there. Yet
both circuits clearly qualify their holdings, and these qualifications act like tethers that pull the decisions ineluctably back toward the middle ground. This Section elucidates that common
ground.
1. Paving the way: Nomura's "same incentive."18
In the end, the First Circuit embraced the strict model, requiring that the named plaintiffs possess personal claims against
each offering for which they sought to represent purchasers. 189 But

184 Hundreds of different offerings may be implicated in these cases. See, for example,
Maine State Retirement System, 722 F Supp 2d at 1161 (mentioning 427 separate offerings).
185 See 15 USC § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(bb).
186 NECA-IBEW, 693 F3d at 149.
187

See id at 164.

18 See Nomura, 632 F3d at 770.
189 See id at 771.
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the court also explicitly anticipated the possibility of a situation
warranting relaxation of the strict model: namely, a case in
which "the claims of the named plaintiffs necessarily give them
... essentially the same incentive to litigate the counterpart
claims of the class members because the establishment of the
named plaintiffs' claims necessarily establishes those of other
class members. '' 90 With the proper "identity of issues ... the
substance of the Article III concern may vanish even if in form it
might seem to persist."'191 And the court went further, giving examples of three cases that might fit this mold:192 Payton v County
of Kane,193 Fallick v Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co,194 and AG.
In Payton, a class of former arrestees who were released on
bail from Illinois jails in nineteen counties contested the imposition of a bail fee as a condition of release.195 This practice, authorized by state statute, was common to all nineteen counties, but
the amount of the fee varied.196 Since the named plaintiffs had
individual claims against only two of the nineteen counties, the
district court dismissed the entire case for want of standing. 197
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit identified this as "a classical
problem of standing," because although all nineteen counties
charged a bond fee, "a plaintiff must allege that a defendant-- -'
the very defendant sued-has somehow wronged her in a legally
cognizable way."198 However, because "[t]he constitutionality of a
bond fee (whether it is $1 or $45) should not differ from one.
county to the next, when such a fee is imposed pursuant to the
same statute," the court concluded that it was reasonable for the
plaintiffs to bring suit against all the counties.199 After all, there
is "no reason to truncate potentially efficient uses of the class action... [which] may be superior to 19, or 102, different cases in
each Illinois county."200 The key to this judgment was that all the
counties were "following a common statute," providing a "common

190 Id at 770 (emphasis added).
191 Id.
192 See Nomura, 632 F3d at 770-71.
193 308 F3d 673 (7th Cir 2002).
194 162 F3d 410 (6th Cir 1998).
195 Payton, 308 F3d at 675.
196

Id.

Id at 675-76.
198 Id at 678.
199 Payton, 308 F3d at 680.
200 Id at 681.
197
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factor [that] assures that the representative has the same legal
claim as the unnamed parties.201

The Fallick court reasoned along similar lines. The plaintiffs ERISA-governed health plan was one of many administered by Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company.202 After being
denied medical benefits, he challenged Nationwide's "reasonable
and customary" standard for assessing claims, which also applied to other plans; the proposed class included participants in
such other plans.203 The district court dismissed all claims regarding other plans for lack of standing.204 On appeal, the Sixth
Circuit held that, once the district court had determined that the
named plaintiff had standing to press his claim, the standing
inquiry was satisfied for all the plans.205 In other words, "once an
individual has alleged a distinct and palpable injury to himself
he has standing to challenge a practice even if the injury is of a
sort shared by a large class of possible litigants.206 As in Payton,

because the practice applied universally, the named plaintiff
could properly bring all the stated claims-including those dealing with plans in which he had not participated.
AIG is the most relevant of these three cases, for it presents
facts similar to those in the cases at the core of this Comment.
After the emergency bailout of AIG, the named plaintiffs
brought a class action on behalf of other purchasers of securities
issued by AIG, alleging that the defendants had materially misstated their exposure to the subprime-mortgage market.207 The
named plaintiffs argued that, because the alleged misstatements
and omissions appeared in three common shelf registration
statements, they had standing to assert claims against all 101
offerings made pursuant to those statements, even those in

201 Id.

202 Fallick, 162 F3d at 411.
203 Id at 411-12.
204 Id at 412.
205 Id at 423.

206 Fallick, 162 F3d at 432, quoting Senter v General Motors Corp, 532 F2d 511, 517
(6th Cir 1976).
207 AG, 741 F Supp 2d at 517. Note that this is not a standard mortgage-backed
securities case-the plaintiffs were purchasers of AIG stock shares and alleged that AIG
misrepresented its exposure to mortgage-backed securities that it (not the plaintiffs) was
dealing in. This posture effectively removes originators from the analysis, because the
plaintiffs had not directly invested in any mortgage-backed securities. Instead, they
sought to prove bad underlying conduct by AIG, such as failing to disclose the valuation
and risk of its portfolio. See id at 522. Thus, while raising some of the same issues, A!G
is distinguishable.
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which they did not participate.208 The court agreed, finding that
they had standing across the board:
[Because] Plaintiffs do not rely on the information furnished
in the prospectus and pricing supplements unique to each of
the 101 offerings but rather on the alleged material misstatements and omissions located in the common elements
of the three different registration statements ... Plaintiffs
therefore can trace the injury of the purchasers in each of
the 101 offerings to the same underlying conduct on the part
of the defendants.209
This would not have been the case, however, had the plaintiffs
relied on misstatements and omissions located only "in the prospectus supplements unique to each particular offering."210
If these cases are read alongside Nomura, the outlines of the
First Circuit's qualification can be discerned: when different
claims concern common underlying conduct-be it by different
counties, through different health plans, or within different securities offerings-they pass muster in a class action standing
analysis. This is because the legality of the conduct will not
meaningfully differ from one claim to the next. In this context,
as the First Circuit pointed out, the substance of traditional Article
III standing analysis vanishes.211
In terms of real-world incentives, it is also more economical
for both sides to apply their resources to a one-off battle, rather
than litigate the same basic issue time and again, with potentially inconsistent and unpredictable results. While plaintiffs
clearly would rather aggregate their resources and reduce litigation expenses by creating a larger class, it could be argued that
defendants would prefer a piecemeal litigation approach, so as to
avoid "bet the company" situations.212 However, considering the
greatly increased legal costs that would result from a multiplicity
of cases, this strategy might well backfire. Even the cost of litigating numerous "victories" might conceivably add up to as
much or more than the cost of a one-off loss. Allowing like claims
to proceed also promotes judicial efficiency by avoiding redundant
208

Id at 537.

209 Id at 538 (emphasis added).
210 Id.
211 See Nomura, 632 F3d at 770.
212 Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 Colum L Rev 237,
292 n 138 (2009) (noting that companies sometimes prefer to settle legal disputes rather
than '"et the company" in litigation).
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review and promotes efficacy by concentrating the efforts of both
sides on a single showdown. Finally, concerns about the adequacy of the named plaintiffs representation are quelled: given the
"same incentive" to litigate the counterpart claims,23 that plaintiff will not shortchange the claims of the rest of the class.
So why, after delineating this qualification, did the First
Circuit find that Nomura fell outside of it? Notably, the court
did not make this finding on the ground that supplemental prospectuses create new registration statements, destroying their
erstwhile commonality. 214 Rather, the court based dismissal on a
perceived lack of commonality in the underlying conduct, which
resulted from different mixes of originators. 215 Recall that the
conduct of originators-failing to verify a borrower's income, for
example-potentially renders an issuer's statement misleading,
and therefore subjects the issuer to liability under the '33 Act.216
The First Circuit stated, "Each trust is backed by loans from a
different mix of banks; no named plaintiff has a significant interest in establishing wrongdoing by the particular group of
banks that financed a trust from which the named plaintiffs
made no purchases."217 In short, because each trust had some different originators, the court thought that the underlying conduct
at issue could vary from one trust to the next. While this holding
apparently tracks the court's qualification, at least insofar as it
focuses on underlying conduct, it departs from the qualification
in spirit-anything less than complete originator commonality
deprives a claim of standing.
2. Following the yellow-brick road: NECA-IBEWs "same
set of concerns."218
Turning to the qualification in NECA-IBEW, it quickly
becomes clear that these two cases stand in less tension than
appears at first glance. Indeed, Nomura's "same incentive" and

Nomura, 632 F3d at 770.
This is the reasoning of many district courts that have adopted the strict model in
mortgage-backed securities class actions. See, for example, Maine State Retirement System
v Countrywide FinancialCorp, 722 F Supp 2d 1157, 1164 (CD Cal 2010); In re Wells Fargo
Mortgage-Backed Certificates Litigation, 712 F Supp 2d 958, 964 (ND Cal 2010).
215 See Nomura, 632 F3d at 771. Note that "different mixes" does not mean that no
originators overlapped.
216 See Part I.B.1.
217 Nomura, 632 F3d at 771.
218 NECA-IBEW, 693 F3d at 162.
213
214
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"identity of issues" language219 sounds much like NECA-IBEWs
"same set of concerns" language.220 Does NECA-IBEW, then,
simply fall neatly into the qualification spelled out by the First
Circuit? Not exactly, for two reasons. First, while the named
plaintiff in NECA-IBEW did allege that the common shelf registration statement contained misstatements and omissions,221 it
also alleged that the unique supplemental prospectuses were
materially misleading.222 Second, like in Nomura, "the originators of the loans backing each of the 17 Trusts ... varied dramatically."223 Under the First Circuit's approach, that fact alone
would have stripped the lead plaintiff of standing to sue the
trusts from which it did not buy.224
To address the first problem, the Second Circuit had to innovate. Here, the "same set of concerns" language did more than
Nomura's "same incentive." Namely, it allowed the court to gloss
over the distinction between a common shelf registration, which
is incorporated into all the final securities offering documents,
and the supplemental prospectuses, which contain information
unique to each offering. Invoking the "same set of concerns" talisman from Gratz, the Second Circuit determined that the shelf
registration-supplemental prospectus distinction "does not by
itself raise 'a number of fundamentally different concerns' because the location of the representations has no effect on a given
purchaser's assertion that the representation was misleading
(the source of the injury)."225
Although drawn from a very different legal contextconstitutional litigation seeking injunctive relief-the analogy to
Gratz is apt. Textual similarity between the documents governing the different claims was as important in Gratz as in NECAIBEW. In Gratz, wherein the named plaintiffs, potential transfer
applicants, sought to represent freshman applicants, the Court
stressed: "The guidelines used to evaluate transfer applicants
specifically cross-reference factors and qualifications considered
in assessing freshman applicants. In fact, the criteria used to
219 Nomura, 632 F3d at 770.
220 NECA-IBEW, 693 F3d at 162.
221 Id at 151.
222 Id. The plaintiff argued that "the common [Shelf] Registration Statement provides the glue that binds together the absent Class Members' purchases of Certificates,
as well as the additionally misleading [Prospectus] Supplements." Id at 157.
223 Id at 153.
224 See text accompanying notes 215-17.
225 NECA-IBEW, 693 F3d at 162-63 (citation omitted), quoting Gratz, 539 US at 264.
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determine whether a transfer applicant will contribute to the
University's stated goal of diversity are identical to that used to
evaluate freshman applicants."226 Similarly, in NECA-IBEW, the
Second Circuit relied on the fact that the defendants "inserted
nearly identical misrepresentations into the Offering Documents
associated with all of the Certificates, whose purchasers plaintiff
seeks to represent.227 Essentially, both courts reasoned as follows: if the allegedly violative language giving rise to two different claims is nearly identical, the same set of concerns is implicated. Thus, it makes no sense to artificially distinguish between
textually similar categories of claims that revolve around the
same fundamental dispute.
The Court in Gratz also eschewed the freshman/transfer
distinction because of the practical similarity between the types
of claims. Both freshman and transfer applicants contested the
idea that an interest in diversity can justify the use of race in
undergraduate admissions decisions, and that justification was
"the sole rationale the University had provided for any of its
race-based preferences in undergraduate admissions."228 In other
words, the claims were focused on the same underlying conduct.
Indeed, the Court noted, "(T]he only difference between the University's use of race in considering freshman and transfer applicants is that all underrepresented minority freshman applicants
receive 20 points and 'virtually' all who are minimally qualified
are admitted, while 'generally' all minimally qualified transfer
applicants are admitted outright."229 In the mortgage-backed securities context, this kind of de minimis difference is analogous
to the potentially irrelevant variations-minute details about
individual offerings that likely have no bearing on the alleged
fraud23°-introduced by supplemental prospectuses. 231 Indeed, as
a court interpreting NECA-IBEW recently suggested, a common
shelf registration may not even be necessary when substantial

Gratz, 594 US at 265.
227 NECA-IBEW, 693 F3d at 162. The court was referring to statements from the
shared shelf registration statement that were repeated in each offering's final documents. Id at 162-63.
228 Gratz, 594 US at 267.
226

229
230

Id at 266.
See Part I.B.2.

231 Of course, the supplemental prospectuses are arguably irrelevant only when
claims are predicated on alleged misstatements or omissions in the common shelf registration statement.
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textual similarity and common originators exist in two separate
offerings, though it is sufficient.232
To address the second concern-different originator mixesthe Second Circuit qualified its innovation, retreating toward
the common ground between NECA-IBEW and Nomura.
Acknowledging that "[t]he putative class members here did not
all purchase debt backed by a single company through offering
documents tainted by a single misstatement about that company,"
the court reasoned that claims concerning entirely different mixes
of originators "could turn on very different proof' about their
underlying conduct, which is what actually renders an issuer's
statement misleading.233 Thus, it concluded, "to the extent certain Offerings were backed by loans originated by originators
common to [the offerings from which NECA bought], NECA's
claims raise a sufficiently similar set of concerns" to establish
standing with respect to those other claims. 234 In short, named
plaintiffs have standing to bring claims regarding securities that
they did not purchase if those securities share similar misstatements and common originators with the securities that
they did buy.

Despite their facially conflicting holdings, NECA-IBEW and
Nomura stand astride common ground. Each court at least imagines an expansion of the traditional scope of standing when the
underlying conduct is essentially the same and the named plaintiff has the proper incentives to adequately represent the entire
class. They similarly reject the formalistic distinction between a
registration statement before and after supplementation with a
prospectus. Where they diverge is in their treatment of originator mixes: the First Circuit would require an identical pool as
between the offerings that the plaintiff and class members bought,
while the Second Circuit requires only some commonality.235

232 See New Jersey Carpenters Health Fund, 2013 WL 6669966 at *3.An example
might be a situation in which an arranger has copied an alleged misstatement from the
shelf registration statement of an otherwise unrelated offering.
233 NECA-IBEW, 693 F3d at 163.
234 Id at 164.
235 The Second Circuit looks for "at least some" originator commonality. Id. It does
not assign a value to or expound on this standard. See note 273.
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Growing an Analytical Framework from Common Ground

Having identified the common ground between NECA-IBEW
and Nomura, an analytical framework can begin to take root
and perhaps grow into a better mode of assessing standing in
mortgage-backed securities class actions. Synthesizing elements
of these and other cases, this Section creates a two-step test for
standing in this context: First, do the plaintiffs allegations concern misstatements or omissions in the common shelf registration statement, the supplemental prospectuses, or both? Second,
were "at least some" originators common to both the allegedly
fraudulent offering that the named plaintiff participated in and
the offerings in which class members participated? Each part of
the test examines a lead plaintiffs interest in different aspects
of the claim-step one ensures that the plaintiff is targeting the
same allegedly misleading statements, while step two verifies a
shared interest in the originators' underlying conduct.
1. Step one: statement commonality.
The first part of this test asks exactly which of the offering
documents are allegedly misleading, with three possible answers: (1) only the shelf registration statement common to all
the securities offerings, (2) only the supplemental prospectuses
unique to each offering, or (3) both.236 This step screens out cases
in which the named plaintiff does not have a personal stake in
establishing that some statements relevant to other class members were misleading.
If only the common shelf registration statement is allegedly
misleading,237 the named plaintiff would have standingcontingent on the outcome of step two-to sue on behalf of all
other purchasers of securities offered under it. This falls squarely
within the qualification created by Nomura's "same incentive"
236 Of course, the final offering documents incorporate the shelf registration statement and the supplemental prospectuses. This test looks at the parts ex ante and would
ignore any nonunique segments of the supplemental prospectuses. For instance, if a
supplemental prospectus substantially repeats some allegedly misleading information
already given in the shelf registration statement, the answer to this inquiry is not thereby
changed to "both." The answer would be "both" if, on the other hand, the supplemental prospectus included substantially unique information that was also alleged to be misleading.
237 At least one court has stated that even a common shelf registration might not be
necessary. See New Jersey Carpenters Health Fund, 2013 WL 6669966 at *3 (determining that substantial textual similarity in the supplemental prospectus of a security issued under a different shelf registration statement would also pass muster, provided
that it had some common originators).
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language;238 that is, claims concerning identical flaws in different securities offerings are not meaningfully distinct. Like the
former arrestees contesting a policy shared across many counties2 39 or the health plan participant challenging a standard implemented in different plans,240 plaintiffs arguing that a common
shelf registration is misleading with respect to the security that
they purchased have the exact same incentives for pressing their
claim as they do for claims arising from any other security issued under that statement. Indeed, this is the result of AIG,241
precisely because the plaintiffs alleged only that the common
shelf registration statement was misleading.242 And if this
approach is consistent with the First Circuit's strict model, it is
certainly acceptable under NECA-IBEWs more permissive
"same set of concerns" language. In that case, the Second Circuit
allowed claims alleging that both the shelf registration statement and the supplemental prospectuses were misleading to
proceed243-something that this test would not do.
If only the respective supplemental prospectuses are allegedly misleading, on the other hand, the plaintiff lacks standing
to represent the claims of purchasers from other offerings. In
this case, the test mandates that the class must be pared down
to purchasers of the securities that the lead plaintiff bought.
This follows because a supplemental prospectus pertains only to
a given offering and contains "transaction-specific details-such
as pricing information, or information regarding the specific assets
to be included in the vehicle from which the securities are issued."244 It is issued as part of the "offering documents" for one
particular security. 245 In these circumstances, there would be no
obvious glue to bind the claims of the named plaintiff and the
class members that purchased other securities.
The more difficult case is one in which the plaintiff alleges
that both the common shelf registration statement and the

238 Though the First Circuit delineated this qualification, it did not necessarily adhere to it. See Part III.A.1.
239 See Payton, 308 F3d at 675.
240 See Fallick, 162 F3d at 411-12.
241 The First Circuit cited this case as an example of the qualification. See Part III.A.1.
242 A!G, 741 F Supp 2d at 538. For more cases holding likewise, see In re CitiGroup
Inc Bond Litigation, 723 F Supp 2d 568, 585 (SDNY 2010); In re Countrywide, 588 F
Supp 2d at 1166.
243 See NECA-IBEW, 693 F3d at 153, 164.
244 Id at 150.
245 Nomura, 632 F3d at 766.
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supplemental prospectuses are misleading in unique ways.2 46
The Second Circuit faced this locational distinction in NECAIBEW247 because the alleged misstatements occurred in both the
common shelf registration statement and the supplemental prospectuses.48 The plaintiff claimed that the problematic information from the shelf registration statement was "essentially
repeated" in the supplemental prospectuses. 49 Unfortunately,
the court did not meaningfully analyze the veracity of that
claim, which is dubious.250 For instance, although the court described the supplemental prospectuses as containing "similar,
generic misrepresentations," it also noted that "only the Prospectus Supplements ...set forth [the originators'] respective
lending guidelines-the descriptions of which, plaintiff alleges,
were [] misleading."251 Indeed, the plaintiff even described the
supplemental prospectuses as "additionally misleading."252 Thus,
while the court elides this locational distinction, the plaintiff in
NECA-IBEW appears to have alleged that the shelf registration
statement and the supplemental prospectuses were uniquely
misleading. In circumstances such as these, how does the proposed test operate? Do the uniquely misleading supplemental
prospectuses poison class standing that would otherwise be validated by misstatements in a common shelf registration statement?
Harsh though it may seem, the answer should be yes-the
plaintiff lacks standing to represent the claims of purchasers from
other offerings whose supplemental prospectuses are alleged to
be uniquely misleading, and the test does not proceed.23 This
outcome is justified by its behavioral impact: If the allegedly
misleading content of the supplemental prospectuses is not integral to the case, class members can simply tailor their claims by
asserting that the common shelf registration statement alone is
misleading, thereby proceeding to step two.26 4 If, on the other
hand, class members rely so heavily on the uniquely misleading
246 This does not include the case in which the supplemental prospectus merely repeats allegedly misleading information from the shelf registration statement. See note 236.
247 See NECA-IBEW, 693 F3d at 162-63.
248
249

Id at 149.
Id.

250 The court probably failed to analyze this claim because, under the Second Circuit's test, the location of the representations is irrelevant. See id at 162-63.
251 NECA-IBEW, 693 F3d at 151, 153.
252

Id at 157.

Note that the proposed test ignores substantial repetitions of information from
the shelf registration statement in supplemental prospectuses. See note 236.
254 See text accompanying notes 237-43.
253
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information in the supplemental prospectus that they must include it, then they are better off bringing separate actions, because the named plaintiff would neither have the "same incentive" to litigate on their behalf nor the "same set of concerns." In
short, the named plaintiff would have no "personal stake" in
proving that unique supplemental prospectuses from other offerings were misleading.255 Indeed, doing so would merely detract
resources from the claim relevant to the named plaintiff, and the
only conceivable benefit to them-enlarged class size-would be
indirect and uncertain.
One might argue that the screening performed by this testor any incarnation of class action standing-is duplicative of
Rule 23 certification. For instance, since a securities-fraud class
action would typically proceed as a Rule 23(b)(3) action,26 plaintiffs would be required to show "that the questions of law or fact
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members."257 Like the proposed two-step
test, this would seem to screen out instances in which certain
class members rely heavily on uniquely misleading information
in supplemental prospectuses. Or, at the settlement stage, sophisticated class members being shortchanged by a lead plaintiff
might receive notice and opt out (thus screening themselves out
of the class) under Rule 23(e)(4).
This is not to say, however, that the proposed test is superfluous. First, the historical trend has been toward an almost automatic certification of securities-fraud class actions,58 suggesting
that a tailored class standing test could screen out plaintiffs that
might be missed at the certification stage. Second, and more importantly, even reaching that stage can be quite costly, because
"[g]enerally, prior to the class certification decision, plaintiffs
seek expansive general discovery into the class claims."259 Indeed, "the class certification process has become increasingly burdensome and costly. .. . [P]roceeding with the class certification

255 See Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 204 (1962) (stating that whether the plaintiff has "a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy" is "the gist of the question of standing").
256 See, for example, New Jersey Carpenters Health Fund v Residential Capital,
LLC, 272 FRD 160, 168-71 (SDNY 2011) (conducting a Rule 23(b)(3) analysis).
257 FRCP 23(b)(3).
258 See Margaret Anne Caulfield, Note, Class Action Certification in Private Securities Litigation: Endangered Species?, 14 Suffolk J Trial & App Advoc 94, 109 (2009)
("[H]istorically, securities class actions were almost always certified.").
259 Linda S. Mullenix, Dropping the Spear: The Case for Enhanced Summary Judgment Priorto Class Certification,43 Akron L Rev 1197, 1236 (2010).
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process entails massive transaction costs involved with precertification discovery and motion practice.260 Thus, properly
applied class standing analysis acts as a frontline screen that
reduces costs for all parties. If anything, the possibility that
some plaintiffs would be screened out during certification increases the need for a functional class standing test on the front
end: if eventual screening of certain plaintiffs is inevitable,
they-and their costly motions and discovery requests-should
be removed as soon as possible.
The proposed rule forces the plaintiff to weigh the economic
benefit of certifying a larger class against the cost of narrowing
claims to common elements. A looser rule-like that endorsed by
the Second Circuit, which explicitly declines to make the locational distinction that step one does261-would basically make
the certification of larger classes costless and therefore prove
odious to defendants, who would face greater pressure to settle.262 It would also jeopardize the interests of class members
claiming harm from different statements, who might receive inadequate representation under the Second Circuit's more lenient
analysis. While determining with certainty whether the statements in the supplemental prospectuses in NECA-IBEW were in
fact essentially repeated is impossible based on the Second Circuit's scant analysis of that question,263 the proposed test, if applied there, likely would have required whittling the claims
down to those pertaining to a common registration statement.
This could significantly reduce class size, forcing claimants
whose evidence primarily concerns statements in supplemental
prospectuses to proceed singly, in a smaller class of their own, or
not at all. Thus, by examining the location of the allegedly misleading statement, step one adds an essential layer of scrutiny
that NECA-IBEW lacks.

Id at 1235 (emphasis added).
The Second Circuit stated that "the location of the representations has no effect
on a given purchaser's assertion that the representation was misleading." NECA-IBEW,
693 F3d at 162-63. By contrast, step one is entirely focused on the location of the representations-it is outcome determinative.
262 These are often referred to as "blackmail settlements." See Matter of Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer, Inc, 51 F3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir 1995) (defining blackmail settlements as "settlements
induced by a small probability of an immense judgment in a class action).
263 See text accompanying notes 247-52.
260

261
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2. Step two: originator commonality.
Assuming that the class survives step one by alleging that
only the shelf registration statement common to a batch of securities is misleading,264 the court should then apply a version of
the common-originator test. 265 This will pare down classes
wherein the named plaintiffs interests are aligned with those of
the class as far as the common statement-because they passed
step one-but not with respect to the originators' underlying
conduct that actually makes the statement fraudulent. Again,
underlying conduct is a bad act undertaken by an originator in
granting loans;266 it has the capacity to make statements in the
offering documents-drafted by issuers, who are on the hook for
misstatements-untrue and therefore actionable under the '33
Act.267

Such screening is desirable because the plaintiff should

develop the case evenly; that is, without some common originators, the plaintiff would lack any incentive to prove wrongdoing
by originators with whom it did not deal. Thus, working in conjunction with step one, the common-originator test ensures that
the named plaintiffs' interests and incentives align with those of
the class members that they represent-both in terms of the allegedly fraudulent statement and the underlying conduct that
renders it illicit.
This step confers standing on only those claims concerning
offerings backed by "at least some" of the same originators ims
plicated in the offerings purchased by the named plaintiff.26

Commonality is relevant only insofar as it concerns allegedly
bad underlying conduct. In other words, a common but blameless
originator cannot bind together two claims relying on the underlying conduct of other, noncommon originators.269 To illustrate the
264 Bearing in mind the substantial-textual-similarity exception. See note 237.

265 See NECA-IBEW, 693 F3d at 164. Note that using the common-originator test
does not amount to adopting the Second Circuit's position, for two reasons: (1) it is pre-

ceded by step one, which makes the locational distinction that the Second Circuit explicitly rejected (see note 261) and thereby screens out a different set of claimants; (2) it de-

fines "at least some," something that the Second Circuit neglected to do. See text
accompanying notes 282-83.
266 Examples of bad underlying conduct include: failing to verify the homebuyer's
income or coaching them to falsely inflate it, generating inaccurate property appraisals,
approving loans at rates higher than the buyer can afford, and so forth. See NECA-

IBEW, 693 F3d at 151-52. See also Part I.B.1.
267 See Part I.B. 1.

268 See NECA-IBEW, 693 F3d at 164.
269 For example, imagine a situation with two faulty originators, A and C, and one

innocent originator, B. Offering 1 involves originators A and B, while offering 2 involves
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test: 270 Imagine that the named plaintiff purchased securities
from an offering involving originators A, B, and C. Class member 1 purchased from another offering involving originators A,
B, and D; class member 2 purchased from another offering involving originators A, E, and F; and class member 3 purchased
from yet another offering involving originators G, H, and I. The
named plaintiff has standing to represent class member 1 because he or she purchased from an offering backed by loans from
common originators A and B. The named plaintiff also has
standing with respect to class member 2, due to common originator A. However, class member 3 purchased from an offering
involving entirely different originators; thus, the named plaintiff
lacks standing with respect to class member 3's claim.
Such a line must be drawn between facially identical statements made by issuers because the underlying conduct of originators is precisely what transforms those statements into misrepresentations and therefore comprises a critical component of
what must be proven. 271 In the example above, proving that originators A, B, and C engaged in unscrupulous lending practices
belied by the shelf registration statement will have no bearing
on the exact same statement made about originators G, H, and
1,272 though such proof is the lynchpin of the named plaintiffs
case. Accordingly, class member 3's claim will not be advanced
by such proof, and therefore he or she would fare better if represented by a named plaintiff with parallel allegations. This crucial distinction serves as the basis for step two.
Difficulty lies in assigning a value to "at least some," which
the Second Circuit failed to do.273 If taken literally, as that court
may have intended,274 "at least some" common originators means
B and C. If the named plaintiff purchased from offering 1, he or she cannot thereby represent purchasers from offering 2, because the only commonality is with respect to B,
who is innocent.
270 This example assumes that all the offerings are covered by a common shelf registration statement (or substantially similar statements), that all originators engaged in
bad underlying conduct, and that step one is satisfied.
271 See National Credit Union Administration Board v RBS Securities, Inc, 900 F
Supp 2d 1222, 1254 (D Kan 2012) ("Proof that other originators deviated from underwriting
guidelines or that it was a general problem within the industry is not sufficient by itself.").
272 G, H, and I may, indeed, have done nothing wrong, despite being covered by the
same registration statement.
273 See FDIC v Countrywide Financial Corp, 2012 WL 5900973, *12 (CD Cal)
("NECA-IBEW does not mention any limitation on its origination rule.").
274 See Goldman Petition at *29 (cited in note 11) (stating that the Second Circuit
held that NECA could pursue claims involving one trust even though only 9 percent of
the loans backing it derived from a common originator).
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that a hypothetical claim related to a mortgage-backed security
with 0.1 percent of its loans originated by B would be swept into
the class so long as B was also involved in the offering that the
named plaintiff purchased from, and provided that both securities were covered by a common shelf registration statement.
While it appears extreme, this scenario nevertheless contemplates underlying conduct-albeit in only 0.1 percent of the
loans backing the hypothetical security-that allegedly renders
its offering documents fraudulent.275 Given the strict liability nature of §§ 11 and 12 of the '33 Act,276 allowing any quantum of
securities fraud, however slight, is anomalous. An obvious counterargument would be that purchasers from such a hypothetical
offering did not meaningfully rely on the allegedly fraudulent
statement, which was, according to this argument, true 99.9
percent of the time. A defendant would attempt to cast these
purchasers as improperly seeking ex post facto insurance
against what only turned out to be, in hindsight, a bad investment. An insolvent defendant might even argue that allowing
such plaintiffs to proceed would rob more deserving plaintiffs of
a full recovery. The flaw with this line of reasoning is that the
'33 Act is a strict liability regime,277 meaning that proof of
fault-here, knowledge that the investment was bad-is simply
unnecessary.2 78 By creating a strict liability regime, Congress
chose to effectively make issuers wear an insurer hat as well.
Even if a judge were sympathetic to such pleas, standing-an
up-front, categorical bar to the claim-would hardly be the remedy
of choice. It would be much more sensible to adjust recovery at a
later stage of the proceedings, bringing it in line with the ratio of
offending loans.279 Accordingly, the common-originator analysis, as
applied in step two of this test, means any commonality.
275 With the caveats about certification noted in Part III.B.1, defendants can take
solace in the likelihood that claims with such minimal commonality would be screened
out during certification. See FRCP 23(b)(3).
276 See text accompanying notes 65-71.
277 See Herman & MacLean v Huddleston, 459 US 375, 381 (1983) (noting that § 11
is "designed to assure compliance with the disclosure provisions of the Act by imposing a
stringent standard of liability'). See also Marc I. Steinberg and Brent A. Kirby, The Assault
on Section 11 of the Securities Act: A Study in JudicialActivism, 63 Rutgers L Rev 1, 10
(2010) (describing § 1l's "virtually absolute strict liability against the issuer" and "minimal pleading requirements").
278 See Dan B. Dobbs, Paul T. Hayden, and Ellen M. Bublick, Dobbs' Law of Torts
§ 437 (Reuters 2014).
279 See, for example, Robert Elkin and Robert J. Bluhm, Indirect PurchaserStanding in Antitrust Actions: Duplicative Liability in the Energy Industry, 11 Ener L J 185,
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How would this test look in practice? Imagine a hypothetical
case 280 wherein the named plaintiff has purchased only from offering 1 but seeks to represent purchasers from offerings 2 and 3
as well. All three offerings are covered by a common, allegedly
misleading shelf registration statement and share 20 percent
originator commonality. Offerings 1 and 2 also contain unique,
allegedly misleading statements in their supplemental prospectuses.281 Unlike the Second Circuit, which would confer standing
to represent all these purchasers,22 step one of the proposed solution knocks out purchasers from offering 2, because their
claim partly relies on uniquely misleading statements in their
supplemental prospectus. 283 Buyers of offering 3 reach step two
because the allegedly misleading statements are located only in
a shelf registration statement shared with offering 1. Step two
diverges from the First Circuit's analysis, which would require
an identical originator mix,2 84 thereby eliminating purchasers
from all offerings except offering 1. Unlike the First Circuit's
approach, step two would allow claims related to offering 3 to
proceed, because they share "at least some" originator commonality with offering 1. Both phases of the proposed test would
operate differently than did either of these courts' approaches,
meticulously ensuring that named plaintiffs share an actual
alignment of interests and incentives with the class members.
CONCLUSION
The present circuit split has thrown mortgage-backed securities class standing into disarray. Supreme Court decisions, as
both the First and Second Circuits noted, have thus far shed little

209-10 (1990) (discussing the possibility of adjusting damages so as to avoid duplicative
awards resulting from differing treatment of standing in parallel state and federal utilityregulation regimes).
280 This hypothetical is loosely based on the facts of Nomura, as developed in the
district court. See Plumbers' Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v Nomura Asset Acceptance
Corp, 658 F Supp 2d 299, 305-09 (D Mass 2009).
281 These are not substantial repetitions of the registration statement. See note 236.
282 The Second Circuit ignores the location of allegedly fraudulent statements, allowing claims partly based on misleading supplemental prospectuses to proceed. See note 261.
283 If they desired to remain part of the class, they could tailor their claim to remove
such additional allegations, relying instead on the common registration statement. See
text accompanying notes 254-55.
284 See Nomura, 632 F3d at 771.
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light on the question of class standing, even in general terms. 285
This Comment has proposed a solution drawn from common
ground between Nomura and NECA-IBEW. Rather than simply
denying or granting standing class-wide, as some district courts
have attempted to do,286 the proposed test screens for standing in
two stages. First, it asks where the allegedly misleading information is located in order to ensure that the named plaintiff has
a personal stake in litigating the same statements as other class
members. Second, it looks for originator commonality, thereby
establishing that the lead plaintiff has an interest in proving at
least some of the same underlying conduct that renders such
statements fraudulent. Accordingly, this two-step test captures
cases that the First or Second Circuits' approaches operating

alone would

miss.287

The proposed test is neither as restrictive as

Nomura, because it elaborates on the qualification hinted at
there, nor as broad as NECA-IBEW, because it would disallow
claims predicated on meaningfully different allegations. Thus,
the proposed solution more delicately balances the respective
interests of named plaintiffs and class members, ensuring that
the former will not be given undue bargaining power and the
latter will not be inadequately represented.

285 See NECA-IBEW, 693 F3d at 160; Nomura, 632 F3d at 769-70.
286 For a blanket grant of standing based on a court's interpretation of "registration
statement," see In re Countrywide FinancialCorp Securities Litigation, 588 F Supp 2d
1132, 1164-66 (CD Cal 2008). For a blanket denial based on a narrower interpretation of
the exact same phrase, see In re Washington Mutual, Inc Securities, Derivative & ERISA
Litigation, 259 FRD 490, 504 (WD Wash 2009).
287 See text accompanying notes 280-84.
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